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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF AN IMPROPER AWARD
In the field of government contracts, if, after formal advertising and
award, it is discovered that the award was improper, what is the legal
status of the resultant agreement? Is it void or merely voidable? The
situation, which is unique to the field of public contracts, is heightened
when the two forums which adjudicate disputes arising from govern-
ment contracts disagree as to the consequences of the improper award.
This problem will be examined here in light of the test furnished by
the Court of Claims and the Comptroller General, the primary forums
for government contracts. Before one can appreciate the conflict be-
tween the two tribunals, however, an introduction to the nature of
government contracts and the requirements of formal advertising will
be explored; this introduction will include a discussion of the authority
of the government agent, with emphasis on the military procurement
aspect of government contracts.
THE AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT
"In the absence of constitutional inhibitions, the sovereign can make
such contracts as it pleases and no one can object." I While the
government has the constitutional authority to contract for its needs,2
latitude to contract is limited to the capacity and authority granted to
the government contracting officer3 whose authority is exclusive and
statutory.4 While an agent ordinarily has such general authority as is
normally included in a grant of power,5 a government contracting officer
must limit his actions to the specific grant of authority:
Different rules prevail in respect to the acts and declarations of
public agents from those which ordinarily govern in the case of
1. In re American Boiler Works, Inc., 220 F.2d 319, 321 (3rd Cir. 1955).
2. Neilson v. Lagow, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 98, 107 (1851); United States v. Tingley,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 128 (1831).
3. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910); The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 666 (1868); G. L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. CI.
1963); United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. IIl. 1943); United States v.
94.68 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Mo. 1942); Armed Services Procurement
Regulation § 1-201.3, 32 C.F.R. § 1.201-3 [hereinafter cited as ASPRI.
4. J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACrS AND SUBCONTRAcrs 208-09 (1964).
5. Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247, 257 (1876); cf. F. MECHEM, OUT.IN.S OF
THE LAW OF AGENCY § 43 (4th ed. 1952).
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mere private agents. Principals in the latter category are in many
cases bound by the acts and declarations of their agents, even
where the act or declaration was done or made without any au-
thority, if it appears that the act was done, or the declaration was
made, by the agent in the course of his regular employment; but
the government or public authority is not bound in such a case.
6
Thus, the capacity of the agent is limited to strict conformity with the
authority conferred. 7 All limitations in the enabling statute apply to any
exercise of authority under that legislation;8 lack of such authority in the
agent renders any purported contract unenforceable against the gov-
ernment.9 Moreover, if issued without authority, no contract can
arise, and any instrument purporting to be a contract is void. 10 Even
where the contracting officer is authorized to award contracts, an award
subject to subsequent approval does not confer any right upon the other
party to the agreement until such approval is forthcoming." When gov-
ernment regulations require that the contracting officer pursue a course
of action, failure to do so confers no rights under the instrument upon
either party. 2 This principle has been applied where a contracting
officer awarded a contract in one fiscal year with funds from another
fiscal year,' 3 where an agent entered into an oral contract, 4 where a
contracting officer had authority to negotiate but not to contract,15
where a contracting officer contracted to pay a sum in excess of that
limited by Congress for the purpose of such a contract," and where an
6. Hawkins v. United States, 96 U.S. 689, 691 (1877).
7. The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868); Reese v. Virgin Islands,
277 F.2d 329, 333 (3rd Cir. 1960); Wildernuth v. United States, 195 F.2d 18, 24 (7th
Cir. 1952); United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. IlM. 1943).
8. United States v. 94.68 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (E.D. Mo. 1942).
9. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 385 (1923); Hooe v. United States,
218 U.S. 322 (1910).
10. Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243 (1912).
11. Ship Construction & Trading Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 419, 462 (1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941).
12. United States v. Millsap, 208 F. Supp. 511 (Wyo. 1962); See generally J. PAUL,
UNIrED STATES GOVERNMENT CoNTRAcrs AND SuBCONTRAcTs 208-12 (1964).
13. Los Angeles v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 974 (Cr. Cl. 1946).
14. United States v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88 (1915); South
Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 118 U.S. 37 (1886); Clark v. United States, 95 U.S.
539 (1877).
15. Wright v. United States, 86 Cr. Cl. 290, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 609 (1938).
16. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910).
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officer used land set aside for other purposes.17 If an officer without
authority of Congress presumes to bind the government, by express or
implied contract, the contract is a nullity and no legal obligation to per-
form arises,' 8 for what an agent does or omits to do cannot create a
claim against the government. 9
If an officer enters into a contract with a private party, and that action
is unauthorized or otherwise improper, the contract is void, and the
other party has no right against the government. 0 Generally, the doc-
trine of apparent authority, and therefore estoppel, are inapplicable to
the sovereign.21 A party entering into an agreement with an agent of
the government has the duty to ascertain whether the agent's acts are
permitted by his authority.22 There cannot be reliance upon the agent's
apparent authority even though the contractor honestly relies to his detri-
ment upon the position taken by the contracting officer. 2  Acceptance
of benefits by the government under a public contract which is void does
not necessarily effect a ratification.2 4 Consequently, the duty to ascertain
the power of the agent is absolute: "One is charged with knowledge of
the extent of the actual authority of the government's contracting agent,"
and no agent can hold himself out to have any more authority than is
sanctioned by law.25 However difficult that process might be, his actual
authority may be ascertained, 6 and ignorance of the law furnishes no
17. Loehler v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 158 (1940).
18. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 324 (1910).
19. Id.
20. Beach v. United States, 226 U.S. 243, 256 (1912); Whiteside v. United States, 93
U.S. 247 (1876); Bryne Organization, Inc. v. United States, 287 F.2d 582, 586 (Ct. Cl.
1961); Los Angeles v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 974 (Ct. Cl. 1946); Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 584, 603, cert. denied, 292 U.S. 645 (1934).
21. Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1916); Shepard
Engineering Co. v. United States, 289 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1961); Reese v. Virgin Islands,
277 F.2d 329 (3rd Cir. 1960). See also Whelan & Dunigan, Government Contracts:
Apparent Authority and Estoppel, 55 GEo L.J. 830 (1967).
22. "Men must turn square corners when dealing with the Government . . ." Rock
Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920); Hooe v. United
States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910); Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir.
1965).
23. Filor v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 45 (1869).
24. Board of Education v. Hall, 353 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Ky. 1962).
25. Blake Construction Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1961)-
National Electronics Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (Ct.
Cl. 1960); United States v. Christensen, 50 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. II. 1943); cf. J. PAUL,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS 209 (1964).
26. Hawkins v. United States, 96 U.S. 689, 691 (1877); Blake Construction Co. v.
United States, 296 F.2d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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excuse for any mistake or wrongful act Although these rules appear
harsh, the government is too complex and deals through too many agen-
cies for any other policy to be practicable.28 The Supreme Court
thought it far "better that an individual should occasionally suffer from
the mistakes of public officers or agents, than to adopt a rule which
. . . might be turned to the detriment and injury of the public." 29
FORMAL ADVERTISING
The presence or absence of authority to contract is especially crucial
at the award stage, when it involves an invitation for a bid. The foremost
mandate of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 194730 is that gov-
ernment contracts for the procurement of supplies and services shall be
made by formal advertising procedures, and shall be awarded "to the
responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation and will be the
most advantageous to the United States, price and other factors con-
sidered." 31 This requirement of formal advertising is the government's
means of securing material and services at the lowest possible cost. For-
mal advertising procedures insure that government spending will be
honest and that, through competition, qualified and competent contrac-
iors will have a chance to contract for the government on an equal
basisY 2
To achieve this equality, a bidding contractor must precisely respond
to the invitation for bids.a Although a contracting officer may waive a
minor deviation,34 any inconsistency which affects price, quantity or
quality of the item offered goes to the substance of the invitation for
bid. 5 This inconsistency makes the offered bid non-responsive, and may
27. Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 325 (1910).
28. Blake Construction Co. v. United States, 296 F.2d 393, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
29. Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247, 257 (1876).
30. 10 U.S.C. H 2301-14 (1964).
31. Id. § 2305(c) (1964); 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1964).
32. United States v. Brookridge Farm Inc., 111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940).
It need hardly be said that the general requirements of advertising for
government contracts is a true rule of necessity to avoid the dangers of
overpricing goods or services, with the accompanying dangers of corrup-
tion in a governmental organization.
New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271, 276
(Cr. Cl. 1957).
33. Wildermuth v. United States, 195 F.2d 18, 24 (7th Cir. 1952); 44 CoMp. GEN-
193 (1964); 8 Comp. GEN. 649 (1929); ASPR 2-404.2(a), 32 C.F.R. § 2.404-2(a) (1969).
34. 30 CoMP. GEN. 179, 181 (1950); J. PauL, UNrrED STATES Gov mNmFNT CONRACrs
Akv SuacoNTAcrs 155 (1964); ASPR 2-405, 32 C.F.R. § 2.405 1969).
35. United States v. Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524 (1912); 43 Comp. GEN€. 209 (1963); 39
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preclude it from consideration for award.36 Such a deviation would
destroy the free competition mandate and the contract accepted under
such circumstances would be void; to hold otherwise would be unfair to
the other bidders.3 7 Contracting officers have little discretion; "they
must accept the lowest or highest responsive bid or reject all and re-
advertise." 38
The competitive bidding statutes require that the government set forth
in their invitation for bids the exact basis for comparison of bids. 9 Per-
mitting the bidders to compete on equal terms requires an invitation for
bid sufficiently definite to allow the bidder to prepare,40 and the con-
tracting officer to evaluate, the bids on a common basis.41 The elements
for impartial evaluation include specifications which are sufficiently de-
tailed in all essentials,42 an award statement which must advise the
bidder of the basis upon which his bid will be evaluated, 43 and an
honest contracting officer, who must maintain absolute objectivity in
order to establish a common basis for full and fair competitive bidding.44
From time to time, contracting officers and bidders err. If a mistake
occurs the most important inquiry is whether or not the mistake has de-
stroyed the balance of full competition and impartiality and has ren-
dered the contract void.
COMp. GEN. 570 (1960); 23 Comp. GEN. 395 (1943). See also ASPR 4-406.2, 32 C.F.R.
§ 2.406-2 (1969).
36. Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. C1. 1963); 44 CoMp. GEN. 833
(1965); See ASPR 2-404.2(b), (c), 32 C.F.R. § 2-404.2(b), (c) (1969).
37. United States v. Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524, 543 (1912); New York Mail & Newspaper
Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl. 1957); United States v. Tri-State
Metal Products, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 455, 457 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Board of Education v.
Hall, 353 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Ky. 1962); 43 Comp. GEN. 209 (1963).
38. 36 COMp. GEN. 94 (1956).
39. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b) (1964).
40. 42 CoMp. GEr. 598, 599-600 (1963); 41 Comp. GEN. 306, 319 (1961).
41. The "basis" of evaluation . . . should be as clear, precise and exact
as possible. Ideally, it should be capable of being stated as a mathematical
equation.... Factors which are based entirely or largely on a subjective
determination to be announced by representatives of the contracting agency
at the time of or subsequent to the opening of bids violate the principle
for the reason that they are not determinable by the bidder at the time
his bid is being prepared.
36 COMP. GEN. 380, 385 (1956).
42. 44 COMP. GEN. 302 (1964); 42 CoMp. GEN. 598 (1963); 41 CoMP. GEN. 306
(1961).
43. 36 Comp. GEN. 380 (1956).
44. This element is manifested by the Gratuities clause which appears in all govern-
ment contracts. ASPR 7-104.15, 32 C.F.R. S 7.104-16 (1969). See generally 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201, 371, 1001 (1964).
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This extended introduction into the general principles of formal ad-
vertising and government contracts illustrates what is generally con-
sidered their rather cut and dried character. It is generally assumed that
any action by a contracting officer which exceeds his authority confers
nothing on the second party to the contract.4 The two primary forums
for the application of these rules of law now must be examined to de-
ternine how these principles are actually applied.
THE CouRT OF CLAIMs
In Prestex, Inc. v. United States,46 the Army invited bids for cloth
for summer uniforms, specifying weight, thread count, and strength.
Prestex submitted the lowest bid, enclosing a sample of cloth. Since the
contractor had performed a similar contract two years earlier, and the
sample resembled the material sought, the contracting officer awarded
the contract. The Army ignored Prestex's cryptic words on the face of
their bid: "Bidding on enclosed sample." 47 Prestex submitted the entire
25,000 yards called for under the contract as the pre-production sample
required to be approved by the contracting officer. The plaintiff's
sample, after being tested by a laboratory, was rejected by the contract-
ing officer, and Prestex was directed to deliver conforming material in
lieu thereof. Instead, the plaintiff complained that the contract award
was based upon the submitted sample and demanded reinstatement of
the contract. The government disagreed, claiming that as the sample
attempted to vary the terms of the invitation, there was no valid agree-
ment. The Court of Claims stated that "[tihe law applicable to the
issue of validity is clear," 48 and later noted that "where the specifications
in the invitation to bid are at variance with the contract awarded the
successful bidder, the resulting contract may be 'so irresponsive to and
destructive of the advertised proposals as to nullify them.' "" If an
agent accepted such a bid, competitive bidding would be rendered
meaningless. Therefore, because the contracting officer's authority is
limited by statute or regulation, an award to a non-conforming bid is
improper, and such an award creates no obligation on the part of the
45. Supra note 20.
46. 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
47. Id. at 369.
48. ld. at 371.
49. Id. at 372, quoting from United States v. Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524, 543 (1912).
"Any bid which fails to conform to the essential requirements of the invitation for
bids shall be rejected." 32 C.F.R. S 2.404-2 (a) (1969).
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government to reimburse the contractor even under a quantum meruit
theory. 0
The Prestex court, while recognizing that an improperly awarded con-
tract cannot result in a valid contract, pointed out that "[e]ven though
a contract be unenforceable against the Government . . . it is only fair
and just that the Government pay for goods delivered or services ren-
dered. . . ." "' The court stated that "[i] n certain limited fact situa-
tions . . . the courts will grant relief of a quasi-contractual nature when
the Government elects to rescind an invalid contract." 52 Specifically,
this quasi-contract theory will be applied, and the contract will be treated
as voidable, when the contract is executed and partially performed on
either side. Where the contract is still executory and there is no bona
fide effort to render performance, as here, the contract will be void and
no recovery will be allowed.5 3 The Court of Claims pointed out that
the government has treated contracts as voidable before,5 but that the
facts in this situation allowed only the conclusion that Prestex's contract
was void.
Prestex is a strict approach and demonstrates that an obvious material
deviation can destroy the validity of the contracting officer's award.
This rule is applied when the deviation is major, that is, it affects price,
quality, or quantity of the article offered.5 Clearly, the contracting
officer has no authority to waive these major deviations; hence, the re-
sulting contract is void.56 The strict approach, while harsh, "expresses
the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for
charging the public treasury." 57 Other pressures and realities, however,
tend to affect and vitiate this harshness. Among these are urgent need
for procurement," good faith performance of the contractor,59
and realization that contracting officers will make mistakes.6" Never-
theless, it is evident that the approach in Prestex was consonant
with traditional government contract rules and with the Comp-
50. 320 F.2d at 373-74.
51. Id. at 373.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 374.
54. New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct.
Cl. 1957).
55. See note 36, supra.
56. See note 37, supra.
57. 40 CoMp. GEN. 679, 683 (1961).
58. 41 CoMp. GEN. 599 (1961); 41 COMp. GEN. 242 (1961).
' 59. 43 Comp. GEN. 761 (1964).
60. 17 COMp. GEN. 53 (1937).
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troller General's position.61 In two 1963 cases, however, the Court
of Claims deviated from this position. In Jobn Reiner & Co. v. United
States,62 the court's test to determine an improper award as void or
voidable was an inquiry into whether such an award is so illegal
that the contractor could not obtain judicial relief.63 It noted that
"Courts . . . are restricted . . . to deciding the rock-bottom issue of
whether the contract . . . was invalid and . . . not whether another
procedure would have been preferable. . . .." In Reiner, the Army
Corps of Engineers advertised for the purchase of generator sets, de-
livery of which was to begin in September and continue until the follow-
ing August. The invitation for bid provided that if the "bidder is un-
able to make deliveries in accordance with the . . . schedule, he shall
set forth . . . his proposed delivery schedule." 65 Immediately below
the delivery schedule the following clause was inserted:
Bids offering a proposed delivery schedule which will extend the
time for the delivery of the quantities as called for in any delivery
period of the foregoing delivery schedule by more than 60 days,
may be cause for rejection of bid. [Emphasis added.] 66
Reiner's bid contemplated their own delivery schedule which ex-
ceeded the government schedule by more than sixty days. Seven other
bidders proposed similar delivery schedules. The contracting officer,
after awarding the contract to Reiner, cancelled it because "the invita-
tion did not adequately inform bidders as to how they should bid with
respect to delivery dates. .... , 67 After an adverse ruling by the Comp-
troller General, Reiner & Co. appealed to the Court of Claims which
held that the validity of the contract should be given the benefit of every
reasonable doubt. The court agreed with the contracting officer who
had construed the word "may" as meaning "might," instead of the Comp-
troller General's interpretation of the meaning as "shall." 68 The court
stated that "if the contracting officer . . . viewed the award as lawful,
and it is reasonable to take that position under the legislation and regula-
61. 40 Comp.GEN. 679 (1961).
62. 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. CI. 1963).
63. Id. at 440.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 439.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 441.
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don, the court should normally follow suit." " The alternative is that
the contractor would be placed in a position of proceeding at his own
expense or forfeiting his bid bond.7" In essence, the Reiner test upholds
the validity of the award unless the invitation for bid is clearly nullified
as a matter of law.
The contract was not breached, since the contracting officer had no-
tified the contractor that the award was cancelled instead of the con-
tract terminated. In this situation the court believed that the contracting
officer can, with an ab initio effect, terminate the contract for the con-
venience of the government. 7' Even though the contracting officer dis-
agrees with the Comptroller General's interpretation of his duty, as
manifested by the above clause, to terminate the contract would not
indicate subordination to the Comptroller's dictation, but would be in
the best interests of government harmony, "as a means of minimizing a
conflict with another arm of Government .... ,, 72 This is consistent
with the general rule that the government can terminate a contract even
when the adequate cause is not apparent until later.73 Therefore, to con-
strue the cancellation as a termination, rather than a breach, limits the
damages the contractor is able to claim, and he will be allowed costs
from the date of award to the date of cancellation. 74
In another Court of Claims case decided the same day as Reiner,
Brown & Sons Electric Co. v. United States,75 the Air Force advertised
for electrical and construction work. The invitation called for a basic
bid with a number of additive alternative items, and a bid bond guaran-
tee of twenty percent of the total. After bid opening, the apparent
low bidder was rejected because his bond was only twenty percent of
his basic bid instead of the required twenty percent of the basic bid
plus the additive alternative items. Since Brown & Sons was the next
lowest bidder, the Air Force awarded the contract to them. Brown im-
mediately placed purchase orders and subcontracts in the amount of
$265,000. Meanwhile, the rejected low bidder made a successful pro-
test to the Comptroller General. The Comptroller ruled that plaintiff's
award was invalid, and directed the contracting officer to cancel the
contract. The plaintiff, Brown, appealed to the Court of Claims which
69. Id. at 440.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 442.
72. Id.
73. College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12, 15-16 (1925).
74. 325 F.2d at 444 (Ct. C1. 1963).
75. Id. at 446.
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held that the agent's action in rejecting the low bid and awarding the
contract to Brown was not unreasonable. Since the contracting officer
knew that the Comptroller General had a policy of considering the bid
bond a material element of the invitation, and had strictly enforced
bond requirements,76 it would appear that the contracting officer's ac-
tions were not unreasonable. In this case, however, because of unusual
circumstances, the Comptroller General came to a different conclusion. 77
As neither the Comptroller General nor the court found any fault in the
invitation, and the contracting officer's action was not clearly illegal,
the court could not say that the plaintiff should be deprived of any re-
covery. Since there was no contract, the "contractor" was entitled to
those damages and costs receivable under a termination for conven-
ience.7 s
Reiner and Broni are illustrative of the Court of Claims' position on
the result of an improper award. This position, according to Judge Davis
in Reiner, is different from that which would be applied by the Comp-
troller General:
This inquiry . . . is not precisely the same as that with which the
Comptroller General dealt. Because of his general concern with
the proper operation of competitive bidding in government pro-
curement, he can make recommendations and render decisions that
as a matter of procurement policy, awards on contracts should
be cancelled or withdrawn even though they would not be held
invalid in court. He is not confined to the minimal measure of
legality but can sponsor and encourage the observance of higher
standards by the procuring agencies.79
In other words, for the Court of Claims to declare a contract invalid,
the award must be so improper, and so obviously deviate, that few
contracting officers would have awarded the contract. Judge Davis
claims that the Comptroller General's inquiry is to cancel the contract
if "another procedure would have been preferable or better attuned to
the aims of the competitive bidding legislation." so The court believes
76. 39 Comvp. GEN. 827, 829 (1960); 38 Comp. GEN. 532, 537-39 (1959).
77. "The basis of the Comptroller General's ruling is not entirely clear, but.., he
seems to have treated the inclusion of the requirement that bids be measured by the
base proposal as an error or mistake rather than an illegality." Brown & Sons Elec. Co.
v. United States, 325 F.2d 446, 449 (Ct. CI. 1963).
78. Id. at 450.
79. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
80. Id.
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that the Comptroller General's interpretation of government contract
law on improper awards is too strict to be a judicial test. While the pre-
vailing view was that a contract is void if the deviation is material
or major, Judge Davis' view falls somewhat short of that test. The
first Reiner rule is that, if the contracting officer treats the award
as valid, there is a strong presumption in favor of validity, and the
illegality must be clear. The second part of the Reiner test is that,
if the Comptroller General applies his test and disagrees with the
contracting officer, directing the agent to cancel, the contract be-
comes voidable: "the Court sets up one standard apparently justi-
fying the Comptroller General's demand that an award be can-
celled and a stricter standard to substantiate the judicial determination
that the award is invalid . , 81 Questions immediately arise. Is the
Comptroller General applying a different standard than the Court of
Claims and other federal courts have traditionally applied? What should
be the consequences of an improper award? Is the Court of Claims
criteria advisable? To obtain answers to these questions, it will be help-
ful to review the decisions of the Comptroller General in the area of
improper awards.
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
It is interesting to note that in recent years the Comptroller General
has faced the problem of improper awards more often than the Court
of Claims. For example, in one bid protest concerning the procurement
of beans for an Indian reservation,82 the agent made a mistake in com-
puting the freight rates. As a result, the contract was actually awarded to
the second lowest bidder. After the mistake was discovered the low
bidder protested. The Comptroller General ruled that the mistake, if
corrected, would not relieve the United States of liability if it cancelled
the award. Although the government could probably escape liability,
the Comptroller General felt that strict enforcement would be inappro-
priate since the government insists upon prompt performance of ac-
cepted bids or payment of any excess cost for failure to perform, and
that the government had made the mistake. "[T] he Government can-
not declare a different rule in this matter than that which it enforces in
81. Shnitzer, Some Limitations on the Validity of Federal Government Contracts
Awarded After Formal Advertising, 25 FED. BJ. 224, 243 n.41 (1965).
82. 17 COMp. GEN. 53, 54 (1937).
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its favor against accepted bidders 3  therefore, the Comptroller
General reinstated the original award.
In another case,8 the Air Force advertised for the procurement of
bomb racks, using dual delivery schedules which gave bidders who had
not produced the items before 525 days to perform, and bidders who
had previously furnished the items 105 days to deliver. The award went
to a "new" contractor, and one of the experienced bidders protested to
Air Force headquarters. The Air Force decided that the invitation
should be cancelled, and the requirement readvertised because the vari-
ance of 420 days in the bidding schedule did not afford all bidders an
equal chance, and destroyed full competition. The Comptroller Gen-
eral disagreed, stating that "instead of price advantage the [Air Force]
has chosen to consider the potential advantage of obtaining a new source
of supply as an equivalent to a longer delivery time . . ." but using
price as a basis for award. This is legitimate, for the development of
new sources of supply is "a material factor in procurement .... I'll
Therefore, since the action was a proper and reasonable exercise of au-
thority, the invitation was not "so contrary to the principles of com-
petitive bidding as to make award of a contract thereunder illegal." s7
At the first opportunity to consider a situation of improper award
since Reiner, the Comptroller General contrasted Reiner and Broum.
88
In this case, the contracting officer cancelled the contract because the
award went to a competitor other than the lowest bidder. The petitioner
protested because he had revised the entire set of government drawings
after the award in order to begin performance on the contract. The
contractor demanded at least the value expended for the work on the
drawings, but the government disclaimed any recovery in that no tangi-
ble benefit was received. The contracting officer's award of the con-
tract was held to be clearly erroneous by the Comptroller General who
voided the contract. By clearly exceeding his authority in awarding the
contract contrary to the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2305(c),89 the agent's
action could not be considered "reasonable." It is noteworthy that the
Comptroller General was applying the principles of Prestex v. United
83. Id. at 54-55.
84. 41 CoMP. GEN. 788 (1962).
85. Id. at 791.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 792.
88. 44 CoMp. G_. 221 (1964).
89. 36 CoMP. GEN. 94 (1956).
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States ° in that the contract was said to be void primarily because the
contract was still executory upon cancellation.91 The Comptroller Gen-
eral believed that even the Court of Claims would find this contract
"a legal nullity." 92
VOID V. VOIDABLE
After analysis, it is difficult to understand why the Comptroller Gen-
eral's position would not be identical to that of the Court of Claims.
Both Reiner and Brown, holding contracts based upon improper
awards voidable, however, were appealed from contrary decisions of the
Comptroller General.93 The Comptroller General attempted to resolve
this inconsistency:
We therefore believe that any variations in the standards which
may be applied by our office and by the Court of Claims in de-
termining the enforceability of a contract already awarded result
from occasionally differing interpretations of governing statutes
and regulations, or different factual conclusions, rather than from
any differences in the scope of our respective objectives.94
It would appear, however, that Judge Davis has set up different stan-
dards; one for the Court of Claims, another for cases appealed from the
Comptroller General. 5 Judge Davis in Reiner did not clearly establish
that the Comptroller General would always evaluate an improper award
situation with the purpose of sponsoring and encouraging the "observ-
ance of higher standards by the procuring agencies." 96 The Comptroller
General's characterization of his responsibility under the law is that:
Where a bid acceptance is proposed but not yet consummated
by a procuring agency and our Office considers such acceptance
undesirable, we may recommend or direct such action as we be-
lieve is required by the public policy expressed in applicable statu-
tory enactments to preserve the integrity of the competitive bid-
ding system. However, the sanction for any decision by this
90. 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
91. 44 COMP. GEN. 221, 224 (1964).
92. Id.
93. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 439 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Brown &
Son Electric Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 446, 448 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
94. 44 COMP. GEN. 221, 223 (1964).
95. Schnitzer, supra note 80.
96. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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Office holding that an accepted bid did not result in a valid con-
tract is our authority under the Budget and Accounting Act, 31
U.S.C. 1, et seq., to disallow credits in the accounts of the Gov-
ernment's fiscal officers for any payments out of appropriated
funds made pursuant to an illegal contract. We do not employ
that sanction if we think a resulting claim would be legally justi-
fied and payment could be obtained by instituting judicial pro-
ceedings. On the contrary, we will advise the contracting agency
and its fiscal officers that credit will not be allowed only where we
are convinced that the agency has awarded a contract under pro-
curement standards which a court would find so incompatible with
governing statutes and regulations.97
In light of this statement, it appears that Judge Davis' characteriza-
tion of the role of the Comptroller General regarding the improper
award of a contract is incorrect at least in the opinion of the Comp-
troller General.08
This view of the Comptroller General is supported by examination
of his decisions. Before Prestex was appealed to the Court of Claims,
the Comptroller General denied recovery on the same grounds as did
the Court of Claims.99 Additionally, where the court and the Comp-
troller General have held the contract void, as opposed to voidable, the
reasons have been the same: the deviation from the specifications or
invitation was major,00 and this precluded full competition; 101 the con-
tracting officer lacked the authority to so contract; -02 and no deliveries
or payments were made by either party. 0 3 The situations where the
Comptroller General has held the contract void include situations where
97. 44 Comp. GEN. 221, 223 (1964).
98. 43 CoMp. GEN. 761, 767 (1964).
With respect to the Reiner case . . . no more need be said than that
we are in complete disagreement with the philosophy [of the Court of
Claims] that this office applies higher or different standards than are
applied by the courts in determining whether a contract award is il-
legal.
99. 40 Comp. GEN. 679 (1961).
100. 44 Comp. GEN. 833 (1964); 44 Comp. GEN. 193 (1964).
101. 44 Comp. GN. 302 (1964).
102. 44 Comp. GEN. 221 (1964).
103. Prestex Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1963); New York Mail &
Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl. 1957); 44 Comp.
GENt. 302 (1964); "the primary question . . . is whether a valid and binding contract
was consummated by the acceptance of the bid as qualified. In that connection, it
would appear from the record .. . that no work had been performed . . ." 44 CoMP.
GEN. 193, 194 (1964).
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the contracting officer had allowed correction of an error not apparent
on the face of the bid, and where he had used arbitrary estimates for
bid evaluation purposes which were different from the actual anticipated
need.1°4 Other examples are where the contractor's bid offered one
year's performance while the procurement specified five years perform-
ance, 10 5 or where the specifications were drawn so as to "preclude full
and free competition, consistent with the needs of the Government.
.. 106 In another case of an invalidated contract, the contractor modi-
fied his submitted bid by a letter which was sent before bid opening.' °
This modification of the bid rendered it non-responsive to the invitation,
and the bid was rejected.
While the Comptroller General invalidated these contract awards on
the ground of improper award, he is nevertheless more likely to treat a
contract based on an improper award as voidable, and will accept prof-
fered supplies or services. Even where the deviation is obvious and more
than "minor," the Comptroller General will enforce the entire contract
if the government has accepted deliveries, 08 or made any payment, or if
the need is urgent, 0 9 or if costs would be increased." 0 Applying the
Reiner standards to these cases would lead to the conclusion that Judge
Davis' characterization of the Comptroller General's reaction in this area
as strict compliance with regulations was misplaced. In the Prestex case,
in determining whether the contract was void or voidable, both the
Comptroller General and the Court of Claims considered it significant
that the invalidity was clear and the contract was still executory."' Since
Judge Davis participated in the Prestex decision, it is clear that, at least
on those facts, the Court of Claims and the Comptroller General con-
cur. The difference between the two forums seems to be the equitable
argument by which they seek to justify exceptions to the rules of gov-
vernment contracts. While the Court of Claims appears to favor the
contractor, the Comptroller General favors the United States but seems
to be sympathetic to the problems of the contracting officers.
In analyzing the Reiner tests, another important factor is the lack of a
104. 42 CoMP. GEN. 257 (1962).
105. 44 CMP. GEN. 302, 305 (1964).
106. Id.
107. 44 Comp. GEN. 193 (1964).
108. 42 Cmp. GEN. 737 (1963); 41 CoMP. GEN. 599 (1962); 37 CoMP. GEN. 190
(1957).
109. 45 Comp. GEN. 71 (1965); 41 CoMP. GEN. 242 (1961).
110. 44 COMP. GEN. 204 (1964).
111. 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. CI. 1963); 40 Comp. GEN. 679 (1961).
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close appellate relationship between the Court of Claims and the Comp-
troller General. One is not superior to the other; they are two avenues
for the contractor to pursue to the same result. The Court of Claims,
like other federal courts, has no jurisdiction until the contractor's ad-
ministrative remedies are exhausted," 2 and the Comptroller General, at
least at the award stage, provides one of the principal administrative
remedies."' While the two tribunals have no more than persuasive effect
upon each other, a disagreement between them can cause confusion when
government agents try to apply the decisions. This lack of uniformity
of decision will also encourage contractors to appeal an adverse decision
of the Comptroller General, thus making any decisions by that tribunal
merely tentative, and thereby defeating the purposes of the administra-
tive procedures.
CONCLUSION
The rule that has been applied consistently by the Comptroller Gen-
eral is the correct rule; moreover, the rule might be stated as whether
or not a contract is void or voidable depends upon the "degree of ille-
gality" and the circumstances surrounding the procurement." 4 If the
illegality is not clear, and the article procured has been accepted, con-
sumed, or paid for,"5 the contract is voidable." 6 If not, it is void. Here-
tofore, the inquiries concerning improper award of advertised procure-
ments were limited to whether the action was a major deviation from
the statutory authority: if the deviation on an invitation of bid was
serious enough to affect price, quality, or quantity, the contracting officer
was required to cancel the contract." With the Reiner standard, the
test is that if any contracting officer feels the award is proper, then it is
112. United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 736-37 (1944). For a capsulized description
of contractor remedies, see Witte, Protesting the Award of Government Contracts,
12 PRAc. LAw., March 1966, at 59.
113. 31 U.S.C. S 71 (1964). Cf. Oakland Truck Sales Inc., ASBCA No. 778 (21 May
1952) (ASBCA stands for Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals). The remedy
for minor bid informalities is ASPR 2-405, 32 C.F.R. § 2.405 (1969).
114. 44 CoMp. GENt. 221 (1964).
115. "However, the basic fact of legal significance charging the Government with
liability in these situations is its retention of benefits .... " Prestex, Inc. v. United
States, 320 F.2d 367, 373 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
116. 320 F.2d 367 (Ct. C. 1963); 45 CoMp. Gnu. 71 (1965); 44 COMP. GEN. 221
(1964).
117. New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 271
(Ct. Cl. 1957); 44 CoMp. GEn. 883 (1964); 44 Com. GEN. 302 (1964); 44 Comp. GN.
193 (1964).
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probably valid."$ Such a standard is too subjective and leaves the indi-
vidual contracting officer without a necessary ascertainable standard on
which to base decisions. The Court of Claims' standard is achieved at
the expense of the preservation of the integrity of the bidding system.
Since Reiner and Brown offer no definite test for either party, they
are inadequate for use in government contracting. Even if the Comp-
troller General's standard, which the writer believes is fair and predict-
able to both sides, is more strict than the Court of Claims believes it
should be, its presence is a means of forcing the contracting of-
ficer to resolve those problems that lead to waste and inefficiency in
government purchasing such as stilted procurement prose," 9 brand name
or equal specifications, 120 and ambiguous award statements. 12 ' Failure to
determine contracts to be void until an illegality is clear might eventually
destroy a contracting officer's incentive to turn out an adequate bid
package, thus undermining the purpose of the procurement statutes.2 2
ROBERT BRUCE INGRAM
118. John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 440 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
119. Id. at 441.
120. 41 COMp. GEN. 242 (1961).
121. 36 CoMp. GEN. 380, 385 (1956).
122. In his article Shnitzer contends that Reiner seems to be an equitable doctrine
and can be squared with Prestex. However, he admits that this contention is somewhat
strained and that there is an abundance of authority to the contrary. Conceding that
it is difficult to reconcile Brouwm and Reiner with other cases on improper award,
Shnitzer states:
The chief objection to the judicial standard . . . is that it completely ig-
nores the prime purpose of the advertising statutes: to proteft the interests
of the United States. . . . If contracting officers may in exceeding [their
statutory] . . . limits, whether in good faith or otherwise, nevertheless
bind the sovereign, the protection intended to be provided by law is
reduced, and worse, a Government employee has in effect nullified, for
that moment at least, an Act of Congress. Supra note 80, at 237.
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